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AN  ANALYSI S  OF  POLI TI CAL  BUSINESS  CYCLE  THEORY  AND  IT S
RELATI ONSHI P  WI T H   THE  NEW   POLI TI CAL  M ACROECONOM I CS
Abs t ract.The  paper  analyses  t he  f our  pri nci pal   m odel   t ypes  t hat   com pri se t he
pol i t i cal busi ness cycle li t erature. I t  t hen consi ders how  t hi s li t erature
com plem ents the ‘new  pol i t i cal m acroeconom i cs’ in analysi ng t he i m pact of
pol i t i cs on  i nfl ati on.   Pol i t i cal  busi ness cycle m odel s can be  classif i ed accordi ng
t o t he pol i t i cal  mo t i vat i ons of  opport uni sm  and i deol ogy as we l l   as by t he wa y
i n w hi ch indi vi dual s form  expectati ons.  Us i ng t hi s classif i cati ons w e pay
part i cular att enti on t o t he underl yi ng assum pt i ons of the m odel s. The paper
concl udes t hat  a sati sfactory m odel  shoul d i ncorporate the possi bi l i t y of bot h
i deol ogi cal and opport uni sti c behavi our.  Wh i l e som e academ ics conti nue t o
f r ow n at  t he pol i t i cal busi ness cycle li t erature, t he ‘new  pol i t i cal
m acroeconom i cs’ has generall y been w el l  received,  perhaps as a consequence
of  i t s f oundat i ons ste mmi ng f r om  t he new  classical  m acroeconom i c r evol ut i on
of t he 1970s.  Ho we v e r ,  t he t w o have com m on pol i t i cal f oundat i ons i n
expl ori ng t he eff ect of pol i t i cal incenti ves on m acroeconom i c vari ables. The
i ncorporati on of rati onal  expectati ons by pol i t i cal busi ness cycle theori sts has
uni t ed t he  t wo   str ands  of  l i t erature t o  som e extent  and  yet ,   as we   expl ain,   t here
r em ain f actors t hat   one can t ake f r om  t he pol i t i cal  busi ness cycle l i t erature and
i ncorporate wi t hi n  t he  new   pol i t i cal  m acroeconom i cs.
K eyw ords.   Po l i t i cal busi ness cycles; obj ecti ve funct i ons;  opport uni sm ;
i deol ogy;   i nfl ati on  bi as.2
1.   Introduct i on
The t erm  pol i t i cal busi ness cycle is usual l y at t r i but ed to t he w ork of Ka l ecki
( 1943).  Ka l ecki argued t hat  governm ent s are subj ect t o pressure fr om  t he
entr epreneuri al class to m ai nt ain t he di scipl i ne of the w ork-f orce through t he
f ear of unem pl oym ent .  Al t hough governm ent  pol i cy to al l eviate the w orst
eff ects of  a r ecession  w oul d  gai n  wi de  support ,   t he  entr epreneuri al  class w oul d
obj ect t o i nvol vem ent  at such an int ensit y i n an econom i c upsurge.  As  a
consequence,  governm ent  are pressuri sed int o ‘shaping’ t he busi ness cycle.
Ka l ecki  r eferr ed t o  t he  r esult ant  cycle as t he  pol i t i cal  busi ness cycle.
Ka l ecki' s m odel  is in eff ect a pressure group m odel .  It s w eakness is the
l ack of analysi s of the relati onshi p bet w een the econom y and groups w i t hi n
society.  The r elati onshi p i s assum ed rather than expl ored. Mo r eover,  there is
onl y one i deol ogi cal mo t i vat i on for governm ent  and t hat  i s to defend t he
i nt erests of  t he  entr epreneuri al  class.
The  ma i n devel opm ent s i n t he pol i t i cal  busi ness cycle l i t erature f ol l ow ed
a r esurgence of  i nt erest  i n t he 1970s.   The  l i t erature can be classif i ed accordi ng
t o t he opport uni sti c-i deol ogi cal spectr um  of pol i t i cal mo t i vat i on and,
f urt hermo r e,  accordi ng  t o  t he  expectati ons  t hat   i ndi vi dual s are assum ed t o  hol d.
These classif i cati on m arks al l ow  us t o i dent i f y four vari ants in t he pol i t i cal
busi ness cycle li t erature: ( i )  t he pure pol i t i cal busi ness cycle; ( i i )  str ong
part i san t heory;   ( i i i )   w eak part i san t heory  and  ( i v)  t he  r ati onal   pol i t i cal  busi ness
cycle.  We   wi l l   analyse  each i n  t urn.3
The  1970s saw  t he em ergence of  new  classical  m acroeconom i cs.  On e   of
i t s mo s t   dram ati c concl usi ons  i s t hat ,   under  cert ain  condi t i ons,   governm ent s are
unabl e to use dem and m anagem ent  pol i cies to i nfl uence out put  or
unem pl oym ent .  The pol i cy neut r ali t y proposi t i on w as i n st ark cont r ast to t he
i dea that  governm ent s coul d actual l y engi neer a busi ness cycle and fr eely
ma n i pul ate t he econom y.   Ther efore,  t he new  pol i t i cal  m acroeconom i cs,  wh i ch
grew  out  of the new  cl assical revol ut i on,  has pai d a great deal of att enti on t o
t he eff ect of pol i t i cs on i nfl ati on and,  mo s t  not ably,  cont r i but ed to t he debat e
about  ma k i ng cent r al banks i ndependent .  Ho we v e r ,  i t  has been show n by
Al esina  ( 1987)  t hat   i t   i s possibl e t o  have  a pol i t i cal  busi ness cycle wi t hi n  a new
classical m odel .  Thi s w eak part i san m odel  wi l l  be di scussed along w i t h t he
ot her pol i t i cal busi ness cycle vari ants using t he cl assif i cati on hi ghl i ght ed
above.   Ou r   addi t i onal   i nt erest  i n t he new  pol i t i cal  m acroeconom i cs i s t o show
how  one can draw  furt her fr om  t he pol i t i cal busi ness cycle li t erature to m ake
concl usi ons concerni ng i nfl ati on w i t hi n a new  pol i t i cal m acroeconom i c
f r am ew ork.4
2.   Pure pol i t i cal  busi ness  cycle
The  pure pol i t i cal  busi ness cycle m odel   i s associated pri ma r i l y  wi t h  t he  wo r k  of
No r dhaus ( 1975).
1  No r dhaus t akes pol i t i cal  part i es t o be solely i nt erested wi t h
pol i t i cal  com peti t i on and t he ma i nt enance of  pow er.   I n so doi ng part i es aim  t o
ma x i mi se t he vot es obt ainabl e at  electi on t i me .   The  electi on peri od i s t aken t o
be of f i xed l engt h so t hat  t here are peri odi c electi ons.  The econom y i s
descri bed by t he fam il i ar Phi l l i ps curve relati onshi p bet w een infl ati on and
unem pl oym ent .   I t   i s assum ed t hat   t here exists a greater  t r ade-off   i n  t he  l ong-r un
t han  i n  t he  short - r un.
Vo t ers are port r ayed as having a poor understandi ng of t he econom i c
system . Thi s is seen as a rati onal  ignorance because of the i nforma t i on cost
i ncurr ed in bot h observi ng and understandi ng t he econom i c system .
Consequent l y,  vot ers are assum ed to use rates of infl ati on and unem pl oym ent
as a guide t o t he governm ent ' s perf orm ance. Mo r eover,  it  is taken that  vot ers'
me mo r i es extend onl y over  t he course of  t he curr ent  electi on peri od.   I n eff ect
each electi on  peri od  i s i ndependent   of  t he  next .   At   electi on  t i me   vot ers com pare
t he perf orm ance of t he governm ent  by reference to som e standard for t he
econom y.
I t  is assum ed that  indi vi dual s’ expectati ons are stati c so that  there is no
change in expect ed econom i c perf orm ance. Thi s all ow s one t o m odel  an
i ndi vi dual ' s vot i ng funct i on as det ermi ned by curr ent pol i cies w hich are
r epresented by rates of i nfl ati on and unem pl oym ent .  The aggregate vot e5
f unct i on  i s t hen  t he  s u mma t i on  of  i ndi vi dual   vot i ng  f unct i ons  and  i s t aken t o  be
quasi - concave.  Mo r eover,   vot ers have  decaying  me mo r y  of  past   events.
The  f i nal   assum pti on of  t he No r dhaus m odel   i s t hat   t he score hypot hesi s
hol ds.  Thi s states that  popul ari t y i s dir ectl y related w it h econom i c out com es.
Specif i call y,  t hi s m odel  associates ri sing unem pl oym ent  and i nfl ati on w i t h
f all i ng popul ari t y.  The def i ni t i on of popul ari t y m ost  com m onl y t aken is the
num ber of peopl e w ho w oul d vot e for the i ncum bent  if  an electi on w as hel d
t om orr ow .
Gi ven t hese assum pti ons governm ent  i s able to expl oi t  t he short - r un
Phi l l i ps  curve  i n  order  t o  ma x i mi se vot es at  electi on  t i me .   I f   t here wa s   no  short -
r un t r ade-off  the governm ent  wo u l d pursue the opt i ma l  infl ati on rate w hich is
consi stent wi t h t he t angency bet w een the l ong-r un Phi l l i ps curve and t he
aggregate vot i ng  f unct i on.   Thi s i s t he  gol den  pol i cy r ul e.  I f   t he  aggregate vot i ng
f unct i on  i s t aken t o  be  t he  social  we l f are f unct i on,   t he  gol den  pol i cy r ul e i s akin
t o  a l ong-t erm  pl anni ng  agency not   di scri mi nat i ng  bet w een generati ons.
Wi t h t he short - r un Phi l l i ps curve governm ent   vot e-ma x i mi sing behavi our
i mp l i es a poli t i cal busi ness cycle. Pr i or to an electi on governm ent  att em pts to
i ncrease aggregate vot es by m ovi ng al ong one part i cular short - r un Phi l l i ps
curve,  tr ading-off  infl ati on for low er unem pl oym ent .  Pr ovi ded i nfl ati on i s not
t oo hi gh t hi s all ow s governm ent  t o at t ain a hi gher l evel of governm ent
popul ari t y.   Thus t he chances of  t he governm ent   bei ng r e-elected are i ncreased.6
Thi s is the m yopi c pol i cy choice and is associated w it h l ow er unem pl oym ent
and  hi gher  i nfl ati on  t han  t he  gol den  pol i cy r ul e.
The m yopi c pol i cy cannot  be sustained si nce it  does not  li e along t he
l ong-r un Phi l l i ps curve or i nfl ati on-unem pl oym ent  t r ade-off .  Thus,  aft er an
electi on  t he  shadow   pri ce of  i nfl ati on  i s hi gh.   The  governm ent   has  an i ncenti ve
t o cont r act the econom y i n order to reduce infl ati on.
2 The l ow er is infl ati on
w hen governm ent  ini t i ates a pre-electi on expansi on t he hi gher the at t ainabl e
l evel  of  popul ari t y  and  t he  greater  t he  chance of  electi on  success.  I f   i nfl ati on  i s
hi gh enough w hen t he pre-electi on expansi on i s ini t i ated, governm ent  can
actual l y  r educe i ndi vi dual s’  we l f are.
The pure pol i t i cal busi ness cycle imp l i es boom -bust  cycles and stop-go
pol i cies. The governm ent  wi l l  induce fall i ng unem pl oym ent  and ri sing out put
grow t h  pri or  t o  t he  electi on  and  r i sing  unem pl oym ent   and  f all i ng  out put   grow t h
aft er  t he  electi on.
The Nor dhaus m odel  can be cri t i cised on several fr ont s. It  assum es that
pol i t i cal  part i es are mo t i vat ed solely  by  opport uni sm  and  t hus  negl ects part i san
behavi our.  Fur t hermo r e, it  ought  to be recogni sed that  pol i t i cal part i es m ay
need t o signalt o di f f erent  sets of  vot ers t hat   t hey are capable of  handl i ng bot h
sides of the Phi l l i ps relati onshi p.  Thus,  a simp l e opport uni sti c or ideol ogi cal
di me n s i on t o t he governm ent ’ s obj ecti ve funct i on coul d be i nadequat e in t he
const r uct i on  of  a r eali sti c port r ayal  of  pol i t i cal  behavi our.7
The Nor dhaus m odel  i s cruci all y dependent  upon t he t r adit i onal  score
hypot hesi s w hereby vot ers credit  the governm ent  in t erms  o f  popul ari t y for
i mp r ovem ent s i n  econom i c out com es.  Ho we v e r ,   t he  score hypot hesi s vi ew s t he
vot ers as non-sophi sti cated. Chappel l  and K eech (1988) di sti ngui sh betw een
nai ve and sophi sti cated vot ers.  Na i ve vot ers are unabl e t o det ermi ne t he f ut ure
i mp l i cati ons of econom i c pol i cy and thus how  sust ainabl e the econom i c
posi t i on i s. Thi s is im port ant because in t he N ordhaus m odel  governm ent s in
t he r un-up t o t he electi on are creati ng com binat i ons of  out put   grow t h,   i nfl ati on
and unem pl oym ent  that  are not  sustainabl e. A  sophi sti cated vot er cannot  be
ma n i pul ated by such pol i cies. Indeed a sophi sti cated vot er wi l l  penal i se these
pol i cies. Mo r eover,  Chr yst al and A l t  (1981) have not ed that  t he t r adit i onal
score hypot hesi s popul ari t y  f unct i on  t ends  t o  be  t i me   dependent .
The  score hypot hesi s assum es t hat   popul ari t y f unct i ons are i deol ogi call y-
f r ee, simp l y relati ng posi t i ve econom i c out com es w it h posi t i ve m ovem ent s in
popul ari t y.  Ho we v e r ,  Sw ank (1991) call s int o quest i on t he st r aight f orwa r d
r elati onshi p bet w een econom i c out com es and popul ari t y.  He  a r gues t hat  we
need to consi der how  popul ari t y i s aff ected by t he fut ure expectati ons of
econom i c out com es.  Sw ank’s argum ent   can be  seen as i m port ant  i n  t hree wa y s .
Fi r stl y,  i t  acknow l edges t he i m port ance of expectati ons.  Secondl y,  i t
i ncorporates the concept  of econom i c com petence and, t hi r dl y,  i t  off ers an
i deol ogi cal com ponent  t o popul ari t y.  Consequent l y,  i t  i s possibl e for an
i ncum bent   t o r eceive i ncreasing support   even i f   an econom i c vari able wo r sens.
I f  t he key probl em  is unem pl oym ent  an incum bent  part y of t he Left  ma y8
r eceive i ncreasing support  despi t e ri sing unem pl oym ent .  Ho we v e r ,  t he
r elati onshi p bet w een ideol ogy and econom i c condi t i ons i s clouded by t he
perceived com pet ence of the pol i t i cal part i es in m anagi ng t he econom y.  If  a
pol i t i cal part y i s beli eved to l ack com petence then even i f  it  is ident i f i ed as
pri ori t i sing  t he  key  econom i c probl em  i t   ma y   not   r eceive  t he  support   one  mi ght
suppose.
I n t he UK  we   can i dent i f y t he Ap r i l   9t h,   1992 electi on as an exam ple of
an incum bent  governm ent  facing w orsening econom i c condi t i ons and t he key
econom i c probl em  being w i del y i dent i f i ed as a higher pri ori t y of t he m ai n
opposi t i on part y.   De s p i t e t hi s t he i ncum bent   Conservat i ve governm ent   wa s   r e-
elected. Consi der t he econom i cs of t he pre-electi on peri od.  The UK
unem pl oym ent  rate in t he el ecti on quart er wa s  9 . 6% ,  a ri se of exactl y 2%  on
t he equi val ent  quart er  of  t he previous year.   The  OECD  average had r i sen f r om
6. 8%   t o  7. 4% .   M eanw hil e,  i nfl ati on  over  t he  sam e peri od  had  f all en f r om   6. 0%
t o  4. 1% .   The  OECD  r ate had  f all en f r om   4. 9%   t o  3. 4% .
3
The econom i cs of the peri od w ere m ir r ored by i ndi vi dual s’ percepti ons.
Ov e r   t he peri od 1991(2)  t o 1992(2),   i n r esponse t o a Ga l l up quest i on as t o t he
mo s t  urgent  probl em  facing t he count r y,  t he m ost  f r equent  r eply w as
unem pl oym ent .   An   average of  38. 2%  of  r espondent s i dent i f i ed unem pl oym ent
com pared to 14. 2%  i dent i f yi ng pri ces as the m ost  urgent  probl em . Fur t her,  in
r eply t o t he quest i on as t o w hi ch pol i t i cal part y w oul d best  handl e thei r
perceived m ost  urgent  probl em , t he Conservat i ves and Labour we r e bot h
i dent i f i ed by 33. 7%  of r espondent s. So despi t e the predom i nance of t he9
unem pl oym ent  i ssue the Labour Par t y di d not  appear t o gai n t he popul ar
support  one m ay have supposed of a left - of- centr e part y.  The com petence of
t he  Labour  Par t y  wa s   clearl y  an i ssue.  I t   appears t hat   t he  com petence f actor  l ost
Labour the 1992 U K  el ecti on and expl ains w hy Labour subsequent l y becam e
‘ Ne w  Labour’   cont i nual l y  str essing  i t s abil i t y  t o  govern.
Labour wa s  o f  course helped by t he grow i ng di ssati sfacti on w i t h t he
Conservat i ves aft er  1992,   but   again t he com petence f actor  wa s   i m port ant.   Thi s
t i me ,  how ever,  Labour wa s  t he benefi ciary.  The per i od fr om  January 1996
t hrough t o t he electi on i n Ma y   1997,   saw  an average of  73. 6%  of  r espondent s
t o M O RI pol l s express dissati sfacti on w i t h t he governm ent ’ s runni ng of the
count r y.  Ho we v e r ,  at the sam e t i me  t here w as no popul ar percepti on t hat  the
econom i c condi t i ons of  t he count r y w oul d get   wo r se.  On l y 4. 2%  mo r e peopl e
t hought  the econom y w oul d get  wo r se rather than i mp r ove w i t h t he l argest
num ber,   39. 8% ,   bel i eving  econom i c condi t i ons  w oul d  stay t he  sam e.
R esearch is needed int o t he concept s of econom i c and adm ini str ati ve
com petence.  Ther e i s a need t o defi ne t hese com petencies mo r e clearl y and t o
expl ore t hei r   i nt erdependence.   Ho we v e r ,   i t   can be  seen f r om   t he  above  analysi s
t hat  popul ari t y funct i ons are aff ected by bot h i deol ogy and com pet ence. The
score hypot hesi s,  upon  wh i ch t he  pure pol i t i cal  busi ness cycle i s bui l t ,   does  not
i ncorporate eit her  and  i s mu c h   w eaker  as a r esult .
A  f urt her  probl em  of  t he  No r dhaus  m odel   i s t hat   of  f l exibl e electi on  dat es.
The  f l exibi l i t y of  t he electi on dat e,  i n eff ect,   presents t he governm ent   wi t h an10
addi t i onal   pol i cy i nst r um ent .   I ndeed i t   provi des us wi t h t he i nt r i gui ng quest i on
of wh e t her it  is the el ecti on dat e that  det ermi nes m ovem ent s in governm ent
i nst r um ent s and econom i c out com es or wh e t her i t  i s these m ovem ent s in
econom i c vari ables t hat   det ermi ne  t he  electi on  dat e.
W e w oul d expect  the fl exibi l i t y of the el ecti on dat e to at  least dam pen
No r dhaus cycl es. It  also poses probl em s in em pi r i cal t esti ng.  Mu c h  o f  t he
evidence,  part i cularl y for econom i c out com es has used eit her a patt erned or
dum m y vari able.
4 Ho we v e r ,  t he const r uct i on of t hese vari ables tends t o be
based around an electi on dat e wh i ch i s not   at  a f i xed i nt erval   but   i s set  by t he
i ncum bent   governm ent .   O pport uni sti c mo t i ves  coul d  be  i m port ant  i n  t he  sett i ng
of t hi s date so that  t he dat e coinci des w i t h an i mp r ovi ng or sati sfactory
econom i c state. Thus,  even if  one fi nds cycles in unem pl oym ent  or out put
around  t he  t i me   of  t he  electi ons  i t   ma y   be  i nappropri ate t o  att r i but e t hem   t o  t he
eff ect of the el ecti on dat e it self .  It  coul d be t he case that  the cycles in fact
cont r i but ed t o  t he  sett i ng  of  t he  electi on  dat e.  Empi r i cal  t esti ng  of  opport uni sti c
mo t i ves as defi ned by N ordhaus i s best done by an anal ysi s of cycles in
governm ent   i nst r um ent s.
The  No r dhaus hypot hesi s assum es a str aight f orwa r d r elati onshi p bet w een
t he m ani pul ati on of inst r um ent s, m onet ary or fi scal,  and eff ects on econom i c
vari ables. The Nor dhaus m odel  appeared in a peri od w hen m acroeconom i c
ort hodoxy wa s   bei ng chall enged by t he new -classical  school .   I n part i cular,   t he
pol i cy neut r ali t y result  suggest s that  anti cipat ed governm ent  pol i cy could be
i neff ecti ve.  If  i ndi vi dual  agents hol d rati onal  expectati ons and t hus use al l11
avail able informa t i on i n formi ng t hei r  expectati ons of a vari able, rather than
me r ely usi ng past  reali sati ons,  on average thei r  forecasts are corr ect.  If  it  is
f urt her assum ed that  ma r ket s are perf ect then i ndi vi dual  acti ons w oul d negat e
anti cipat ed governm ent   pol i cy.
De s p i t e t hese  r eservat i ons  t he  pure pol i t i cal  busi ness cycle m odel   cont ains
qual i t i es w hich can be buil t  upon.  I t s simp l i cit y i nvoked m uch of t he
subsequent   l i t erature.  I n part i cular,   i t   hel ped i n di vi di ng t he l i t erature bet w een
pri ma r i l y opport uni sti c or i deol ogi call y m ot i vat ed m odels and accordi ng t o
wh e t her  i ndi vi dual s are deem ed t o  f orm  adapti ve  or  r ati onal   expectati ons.
3.   Part i san t heory
The pure pol i t i cal busi ness cycle approach om it t ed an ideol ogi cal di me n s i on
f r om  t he ut i l i t y funct i on of pol i t i cians. Pol i t i cal part i es are a coali t i on of
i nt erests. A ssum ing t hat  the onl y m ot i vat i on i s to retain pow er ignores issues
r elati ng t o t he pursuance of part i san int erests. Par t i san theory has cat egori sed
pol i t i cal  part i es as bei ng of  t he Lef t   or  Ri ght .   I t   has port r ayed t he part y of  t he
Lef t  as being concerned w i t h t he i nt erests of the w orker and t he part y of the
Ri ght  as defendi ng t he i nt erests of the ent r epreneur.  In order to defend t hese
i nt erests part i san theory assum es that  a part y of t he Left  wi l l  pri ori t i se
unem pl oym ent  over i nfl ati on and undert ake m onetary and fi scal pol i cies to
prom ot e grow t h  and  we l f are.  The  part y  of  t he  r i ght   wi l l   pri ori t i se i nfl ati on  over12
unem pl oym ent .   M onet ary  and  f i scal  pol i cy wi l l   be  t i ght er  t han  under  a part y  of
t he  Lef t .
The def i ni t i on of part i san theory st r esses that  pol i t i cal part i es w il l  have
di f f erent  econom i c pri ori t i es.  The  val i dat i on  of  part i san t heory  com es f r om   t wo
r elated perspecti ves.   The  f i r st  i s a purely  econom i c val i dat i on  of  t he  concept  of
part i sanshi p.  I t  consi ders how  i ndi vi dual s are aff ected dif f erentl y over t he
course of  t he busi ness cycle.  I f   i t   i s possibl e t o i dent i f y groups such t hat   t hey
are aff ected dif f erentl y over the course of the busi ness cycle, then i t  w oul d
appear  val i d t o have pol i t i cal  part i es t hat   off ered di f f erent  econom i c pri ori t i es.
The pol i t i cal part i es w oul d t hen be abl e to aff ect pol i cy in order to serve t he
econom i c i nt erests of  t hei r   core const i t uent s.
The t ypi cal econom i c vali dat i on i s to consi der t he share of nat i onal
i ncom e goi ng t o capit al and l abour over the course of the busi ness cycle. For
i nst ance, Hi bbs (1977) cit es evidence t hat  the profi t  to w ages rati o i ncreases
steadil y aft er a tr ough i n busi ness acti vi t y,  peaking hal f wa y  t hrough an
expansi on,   before f all i ng aw ay.  Si nce unem pl oym ent   t ypi call y l ags changes i n
out put ,  unem pl oym ent  wi l l  tend t o fall  as the profi t  to w ages rati o al so fall s.
Un e mp l oym ent  wi l l  onl y fall  wh e n  i t  i s profi t able for f i r ms  t o change
em ploym ent   l evels r ather  t han ut i l i sati on r ates.  H ence,  an i ncrease i n t he share
of i ncom e goi ng t o l abour wi l l  coinci de w i t h a fall  i n product i vi t y.  Thi s
suggest s a negat i ve r elati onshi p bet w een l abour' s share of  nat i onal   i ncom e and
product i vi t y m easures. Fur t hermo r e, t he analysi s imp l i es that  wi t h fall i ng
unem pl oym ent  t he w aged sect or as an enti t y benefi t s. Conversely,  r i sing13
unem pl oym ent  i s associated w it h a fall i ng share of nat i onal  i ncom e t o t he
w aged  sector  and  a r i se i n  bot h  product i vi t y  and  t he  profi t   t o  wa g e s   r ati o.
Re de r  (1955) and Phel ps (1972) argue t hat  a ti ght ening i n t he l abour
ma r ket  wi l l  cause a narr ow i ng of w age di f f erenti als.
5  A  t i ght ening of t he
l abour ma r ket ,  wh i ch reduces labour slack for every ki nd of j ob,  causes a
subst i t ut i on eff ect  wh e r eby wo r kers wi t h t he mi ni mu m  specif i ed qual i f i cati ons
can substi t ut e for t hose previousl y m ore skil l ed. The eff ect i s to raise the
equi l i bri um  w age pai d on j obs requi r i ng l ess than t he hi ghest  degree of skil l
i ni t i ati ng  a dom i no  eff ect  of  subst i t ut i on  wi t hi n  t he  l abour  ma r ket .
Phel ps bel i eves that  the l ess skil l ed w il l  fare bett er in get t i ng j obs w hen
t he l abour ma r ket  i s ti ght er because the cost  of overl ooki ng t hem  or
di scri mi nat i ng against   t hem  has i ncreased.  The  m echanism  t hrough wh i ch t hi s
operates i s upgrading.
The i m port ance of em ploym ent  over the busi ness cycle and the st ate of
t he l abour  ma r ket   has att r acted mu c h   att enti on.   I t   i s bel i eved t hat   em ploym ent
eff ects are quant i t ati vel y greater than t hose st e mmi ng fr om  i nfl ati on.  Thurow
( 1970),   wh i l e f i ndi ng  t hat   i nfl ati on  l eads t o  f urt her  i nequal i t y  of  i ncom es  f ound
t hat  t he eff ects of hi gher unem pl oym ent  we r e nine t i me s  mo r e pot ent i n
det ermi ni ng t he i ncom es of wa g e - earners and t he poor.  Thurow  suggest s that
t he com bi nat i on of l ow  unem pl oym ent  and hi gh i nfl ati on has a net
r edistr i but i ve  eff ect  t ow ards  l ow er  pai d  wo r kers and  t he  poor.14
A  second val i dat i on of part i san theory i s off ered by pol l s of pol i t i cal
support .   Hi bbs ( 1982)  consi ders how  social  class i n t he UK  aff ects answ ers t o
opi ni on pol l s concerni ng t he num ber w ho see unem pl oym ent  as the m ost
i m port ant probl em . The r epli es w ere for Oc t ober 1964,  Sept em ber 1969,  and
M ay 1975.  Wh i l e there w as a ti me  d i me n s i on,  such that  regardl ess of class a
hi gher num ber repli ed that  unem pl oym ent  wa s  t he m ost  im port ant probl em  in
1969 r elati ve t o 1964 and i n 1975 r elati ve t o 1969,   i t   wa s   alwa y s   t he case t hat
l ow er  social  classes show ed  a greater  concern  f or  unem pl oym ent .
Hi bbs (1982) esti ma t es a poli t i cal support  m odel  am ong occupat i onal
groups for t he peri od 1962(3) t o 1978(4).  The pol i t i cal support  f or t he
i ncum bent  governm ent  wa s  f ound t o vary m ore across occupat i onal  groups i n
r elati on t o unem pl oym ent  t han i nfl ati on.  Mo r eover,  l ow er social classes
expressed thei r  sensit i vi t y t ow ards unem pl oym ent  l evels via thei r  vot i ng
i nt enti ons.
3. 1  St rong  part i san  t heory
Par t i san theory can be categori sed accordi ng t o w het her part i san pol i cies are
t hought  to have perm anent  eff ects on t he econom y and w het her governm ent
persistentl y pursues such poli cies. St r ong part i san theory t akes the pursuit  of
t he part i san econom i c pri ori t i es as both t he sol e obj ecti ve and m ot i vat i on of
pol i t i cal  behavi our  and as havi ng persistent  eff ects on t he econom y.   Ther efore,15
i t  li es at the opposi t e end of the i deol ogy-opport uni sti c spectr um  t o t he pure
pol i t i cal  busi ness cycle m odel .
Wi t h st r ong part i san theory,  as w it h t he N ordhaus hypot hesi s, i t  i s
assum ed that  governm ent  is able to m ani pul ate the econom y.  The abil i t y t o
ma n i pul ate t he  econom y  f or  part i san obj ecti ves  r esult s i n  str ong  part i san t heory
also bei ng r eferr ed t o as t he part y cont r ol   hypot hesi s.  St r ong part i san t heory i s
closel y associated wi t h D ougl as Hi bbs.
6  Tes t s f or  t he eff ect  of  str ong part i san
t heory t hus i nvol ve analysi ng wh e t her  t he Lef t   versus Ri ght   di me n s i on has l ed
t o di scerni bl e part i san eff ects on econom i c inst r um ent s and out com es, net  of
t r ends,   cycles and  r andom   f l uct uat i ons.     Ho we v e r ,   i f   i deol ogi es are not   const ant
t hen  we   ma y   have  governm ent   specif i c eff ects r ather  t han  part y  specif i c eff ects.
St r ong part i san theory assum es that  the onl y m ot i vat i on of pol i t i cians is
i deol ogy.   Re - electi on  consi derati ons  are not   consi dered.
7  I t   f urt her  assum es t hat
governm ent   can ma n i pul ate t he econom y t o achieve t he desi r ed part i san goal s.
The r ol e for popul ari t y i s imp l i cit  in det ermi ni ng t he behavi our bet w een the
pol i t y and t he econom y si nce the pol i t i cal part i es aim t o sat i sfy t hei r  core
const i t uent s.
3. 2  C onventi onal   we ak     part i san  t heory
W eak part i san t heory i nfers t r ansit ory part i san eff ects.  The  wo r ks of  Fr ey and
Schnei der are the cl assic exposi t i ons of convent i onal  w eak part i san theory.
8
Thei r  wo r k hi ghl i ght s a tr ade-off  bet w een opport uni sm  and i deol ogy.  By
i ncorporati ng bot h behavi oural characteri sti cs in governm ent ’ s obj ecti ve16
f unct i on,  w e m ove aw ay fr om  t he pol ari sed perspecti ves of the pure pol i t i cal
busi ness cycle and str ong part i san m odel s. The m echanism  that  underpi ns t he
Fr ey and Schnei der m odel  i s one w hi ch sw it ches behavi our f r om  bei ng
opport uni sti call y m ot i vat ed to bei ng i deol ogi call y m ot i vat ed. The key t o t hi s
sw it ching  m echanism  i s governm ent ' s popul ari t yl ead over  t he ma i n opposi t i on
part y.  G overnm ent  has i n m i nd an i deal popul ari t y l ead. Thi s ideal lead is
r eferr ed to as t he cri t i cal popul ari t y l ead. G overnm ent  feels electorall y safe
wh e n   i t s actual   popul ari t y l ead i s i n excess of  t he cri t i cal  popul ari t y l ead.  Thi s
cri t i cal  l ead i s a f unct i on of  t he posi t i on i n t he electi on peri od.   The  nearer  t he
f ort hcom i ng  electi on,   t he  hi gher  t he  desi r ed cri t i cal  popul ari t y  l ead.
I f   governm ent ' s actual   popul ari t y  l ead i s i n  excess of  t he  cri t i cal  popul ari t y
l ead then governm ent  hol ds a popul ari t y surpl us.  If  governm ent ' s popul ari t y
l ead f all s short   of  t he  cri t i cal  l ead t hen  governm ent   hol ds  a popul ari t y  defi cit .   A
popul ari t y  surpl us  mo t i vat es governm ent   t o  act  i deol ogi call y  wh i l e a popul ari t y
defi cit   mo t i vat es t hem   t o  act  opport uni sti call y.
Fr ey and  Schnei der  defi ne  opport uni sti c behavi our  i n  accordance  wi t h  t he
pre-electi on expansi on hi ghl i ght ed by N ordhaus (1975).  Ho we v e r ,  t hi s
behavi our i s not  confi ned sol ely t o t he run-up t o t he next  electi on but  t o
w henever  governm ent   hol ds a popul ari t y defi cit .   The  score hypot hesi s i s again
assum ed so that  to i ncrease popul ari t y governm ent  ma n i pul ates the l evers of
governm ent  pol i cy to eff ect econom i c vari ables, such as unem ploym ent  and
i nfl ati on.  I deol ogi cal behavi our i s defi ned by t he desi r ed proport i on of
governm ent   expendi t ures i n GDP.   I n t he UK  case Labour  wi l l   desi r e a hi gher17
r elati ve si ze of governm ent  expendi t ure. Thi s sati sfi es the part i san
characteri sti cs of  a Lef t - wi ng  part y  i n  prom ot i ng  we l f are and  econom i c grow t h.
Fr ey and Schnei der  t hus defi ne narr ow  behavi oural  t ypes.   The  popul ari t y
l ead i ndex sw it ches behavi our  bet w een t hat   of  t he pure pol i t i cal  busi ness cycle
and t hat  of str ong part i san theory.  The popul ari t y l ead index i s in eff ect
governm ent ' s i ndi cator.
The Fr ey and Schnei der pol i t i co-econom i c m odel i s based upon t wo
f unct i ons - an evaluat i on funct i on and a reacti on funct i on.  The evaluat i on
f unct i on i s open t o t hose cri t i cism s levell ed at t he score hypot hesi s.
Convent i onal   w eak part i san t heory f urt her  assum es t hat   governm ent s can alt er
r eal  econom i c vari ables.H ow ever,   probl em s can be  i dent i f i ed wi t h  t he  r eacti on
f unct i on.  Chr yst al and A l t  (1981) quest i on t he t r eatme n t  of the Labour Par t y.
Ther e is no cl ear di sti nct i on bet w een that  behavi our characteri sing Labour
under posi t i ve and negat i ve popul ari t y l ead dif f erenti als. In bot h si t uat i ons
Labour is seen as increasing expendi t ures. Chr yst al and A l t  ask w hy Labour
shoul d  have  a t arget   share of  expendi t ures i n  nat i onal   i ncom e  wh e n   t hey  have  a
posi t i ve popul ari t y l ead dif f erenti al and not  wh e n  t hey have a negat i ve
popul ari t y  l ead di f f erenti al.   A  second  probl em  wi t h  t he  r eacti on  f unct i on  i s t hat
i deol ogi cal di f f erences betw een the part i es are assum ed not  t o al t er t he
r elati onshi p bet w een i nst r um ent s and t arget s.  Thi s i s part i cularl y so wh e n   one
i s looki ng at  part i cular com ponent s of expendi t ures w hich m ay be favoured
mo r e by  one  part y  t han  anot her.18
The f l exibi l i t y of t he el ecti on dat e causes dif f i cult y t o al l  pol i t i cal
busi ness cycle m odel s in t h e  UK.  He r e it  int erf eres w it h t he concept  of the
cri t i cal popul ari t y l ead upon w hi ch the sw i t ch betw een ideol ogi cal and
opport uni sti c behavi our depends.  I f  t he el ecti on dat e is fi xed t here is a
det ermi nat e popul ari t y l ead at every i nst ance in t he el ecti on cycle. Wi t h a
f l exibl e electi on dat e  we  wo u l d expect  t he opport uni sti c dime n s i on i n t he
m odel  t o be dam pened.  Thi s w il l  aff ect t he probabi l i t y of opport uni sti c
behavi our over the course of the el ecti on cycle w hich w it h a fi xed el ecti on
peri od  ma y   have  been expected t o  i ncrease.
An   area of  i nt erest  t hat   does  not   appear  t o  have  been previousl y  addressed
i s the choi ce of governm ent ' s indi cator wh i ch sw it ches behavi our bet w een
opport uni sm  and  i deol ogy.   I n  t he  Fr ey and  Schnei der  m odel   t he  popul ari t y  l ead
i ndi cator  i s seen as bei ng aff ected by econom i c vari ables.  Thus ,   t he i ndex can
be used as an indi cator by governm ent  as a guide t o i t s re-electi on chances.
Ho we v e r ,  wh i l e tr adit i onal  popul ari t y i ndi ces m ight  indi cate poor re-electi on
chances,  pol l s r elati ng t o t he l i kel y wi nners of  t he next   electi on mi ght   actual l y
i ndi cate that  the i ncum bent  is expected to w i n.  Thi s w as cert ainl y a com m on
occurr ence in t he 1980s.  A ccordi ng t o G al l up,  bet w een 1982(2) and 1989(4),
vot ers consi stentl y bel i eved that  the Conservat i ves w ere the l i kel y w i nners of
t he next   electi on.   I ndeed onl y i n 1986(2)  di d mo r e peopl e bel i eve t hat   Labour
we r e m ore li kel y t o w i n t he next  electi on t han t he Conservat i ves.
9 In eff ect,
wh a t  m ay be referr ed to as t he w i nners index i nferr ed less opport uni sti c
behavi our  t han  t he  popul ari t y  l ead i ndex  i n  t hi s peri od.19
3. 3  Rat i onal   part i san  t heory
The second exam pl e of w eak part i san theory i s rati onal  part i san theory.  Thi s
has  i t s f oundat i ons  i n  new   classical  m acroeconom i cs and  i s t hus  a new   pol i t i cal
m acroeconom i c m odel .  Thi s m odel  i s im port ant because it  show s how  a
pol i t i cal busi ness cycle can em erge w i t hi n a new  cl assical fr am ew ork.  It  is
pri ma r i l y associated w it h t he w orks of Al bert o A l esina.
10 It  di f f ers fr om  t he
Fr ey and Schnei der  vari ant  of  w eak part i san t heory i n i m port ant  r espects.  The
t r ansit ory nat ure of part i san eff ects does not  invol ve any t r ade-off  bet we e n
opport uni sti c and ideol ogi cal behavi our.  I t  stem s fr om  el ecti on result
uncert aint y and t he new  cl assical m acroeconom i c fr am ew ork.  Indi vi dual s are
assum ed to be ful l y i nforme d  i n every ot her r espect and t o hol d rati onal
expectati ons.  Pol i t i cal part i es are assum ed part i san. In a si ngl e part y system
wi t h no el ecti ons pol i cy neut r ali t y w oul d exi st.  Ho we v e r ,  pol i cy surpri ses are
generated by t he uncert aint y over  t he electi on r esult .   To  understand t he t heory
i n  mo r e det ail   we   f ol l ow   Al esina  ( 1987).
I n t he simp l est  case wa g e   cont r acts are signed annual l y.   Wa g e - bargai ners
i n t he peri od pri or t o an electi on are faced w it h an event wh i ch has a
probabi l i sti c out com e. The m odel  assum es that  electoral com peti t i on i nvol ves
t wo   pol i t i cal  part i es.  Ther e are t hus t wo   possibl e out com es each of  wh i ch can
be assigned w i t h a probabi l i t y t hat  i s exogenousl y det ermi ned.  A  Lucas20
surpri se suppl y  f unct i on  i s used  t o  descri be  t he  econom i c system  as i n  equat i on
( 1).
* ) (Y W Y t t t + − Π =a ( 1)
wh e r e,Yt   =  r ate of  grow t h  of  out put   ( i n  peri od  t ) ;   P t   =  i nfl ati on r ate;  W t   =  r ate
of  grow t h  of  nom i nal   wa g e s ;   Y
*  =  r ate of  grow t h  of  out put   com pati bl e wi t h  t he
nat ural  r ate of  unem pl oym ent .
Wa g e - bargai ners are assum ed not   t o suff er  f r om  m oney i l l usi on and t hus
set t he rate of grow t h i n nom i nal  wa g e s  i n accordance w i t h t he expect ed
i nfl ati on  r ate.  Wa g e   cont r acts f or  t he  next   peri od  are based  upon  t hose  r ati onal
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wh e r e E( Π)   i s expected i nfl ati on.   Subst i t ut i ng  equat i on  ( 2)  i nt o  ( 1):
YE Y tt = =− −+ + a(( ) )
* ΠΠ ( 3)
Equat i on ( 3),   t hus,   i mp l i es t hat   devi ati ons i n t he r ate of  grow t h of  out put
f r om  t he nat ural rate result  fr om  devi ati ons i n actual  infl ati on fr om  expect ed
i nfl ati on.  I t  i s the probabi l i sti c electi on result  and t he part i san nat ure of
pol i t i cal part i es that  off ers the possi bi l i t y of such devi ati ons.  Of  t he t wo
part i es,  t he part y of  t he Lef t ,   part y L,   i s mo r e sensit i ve t o unem pl oym ent   and
has  a str onger  i ncenti ve  t han  t he  part y  of  t he  Ri ght ,   part y  R,   t o  generate pol i cy21
surpri ses and  grow t h.   Par t y  L  i s wi l l i ng  t o  prom ot e grow t h  and  hi gher  l evels of
we l f are and  prepared t o  f i nance  t hi s by  m oney  creati on.
Al esina  ( 1987)  presents t he  obj ecti ve  f unct i ons  of  t he  t wo   pol i t i cal  part i es
as cost  f unct i ons.   A ssum e t hat   part y  L  has  an i deal  or  bl i ss poi nt   i nfl ati on  r ate,
c, wh i ch is  unaff ected by w hether or not  t hi s is expected, and penal i ses
decreases in t he rate of grow t h as i ndi cated by t he param eter b' .  The cost
f unct i on  f or  part y  of  t he  Lef t   can be  wr i t t en as: 









wh e r eq   i s a di scount   f actor  assum ed equal   f or  bot h part i es.  The  s u mma t i on i s
over all  curr ent and fut ure peri ods.  To s i mp l i f y t he al gebra, out put  enters
l i nearl y i nt o t he cost  funct i on.  The par t y of the Ri ght  att r i but es no val ue t o
unexpect ed i nfl ati on  and  t hei r   i deal  i nfl ati on  r ate i s zero.   The  cost  f unct i on  f or
t he  part y  of  t he  Ri ght   can be  wr i t t en as:
Zq t
Rt





Subst i t ut i ng  ( 3)  i nt o  ( 4)  and  assum ing  Y
*  =0:













Gi ven  t hat   we   can wr i t e t he  i nfi ni t e s u mma t i on  of  qt   as 1/ ( 1-q)  and  l et  b= b ' a
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Π − Π − Π − Π Σ = ( 7)
I t  is assum ed that  pol i cy-ma k e r s can choose t he rate of infl ati on.  The
elected part y t hus set s infl ati on i mme d i ately aft er the el ecti on.  Ther e exists a
probabi l i t y di str i but i on of electoral out com es w hich, gi ven t he assum pti on of
r ati onal i t y,  is not  dependent  on ei t her curr ent or past  econom i c perf orm ance.
The pr obabi l i t y of part y L bei ng el ected is P and t he probabi l i t y of part y R
bei ng  elected i s,  hence,   1-P.
Op i ni on pol l s taken in peri od t - 1 provi de w age-bargai ners w it h
i nforma t i on on vot i ng i nt enti ons and reveal P.  Ho we v e r ,  wh e n  wa g e s  a r e set
t here is electi on result  uncert aint y.  Thi s uncert aint y i s onl y relevant to t hose
cont r acts negot i ated pri or  t o t he electi on f or  t he peri od t   i n wh i ch t he electi on
occurs.
W hen elected the governi ng part y chooses t he rate of infl ati on so as t o
mi ni mi se it s ow n cost  funct i on.  A ssum ing i nfl ati onary expect ati ons are given
t he  f i r st  order  condi t i on  f or  t he  part y  of  t he  Lef t   i s:
Πt
L bc = =+ + ( 8)
The  f i r st  order  condi t i on  f or  t he  part y  of  t he  Ri ght   i s:
Πt
R = = 0 ( 9)
I n  peri od  t - 1  wa g e - bargai ners set:23
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I f  part y L i s elected in peri od t  there is unexpect ed infl ati on and t herefore
out put   grow t h  i s above  t he  nat ural  l evel  Y* :
YE P b c t
L
t
L = =− −= =− −+ + aa [( ) ]( ) () ΠΠ1 ( 11)
I f   part y  R  i s elected i n  peri od  t   t here i s a cont r acti on:
YE P b c t
R
t
R = =− −= =− −+ + aa [( ) ]( ) ΠΠ ( 12)
Gi ven our assum pti ons,  w e can view  b as the di f f erence betw een the
desi r e of t he part i es to generate surpri se infl ati on and c as t he di f f erence
bet w een the i deal rates of i nfl ati on of t he t w o pol i t i cal part i es. Ther efore,
Al esina (1987) li kens t hese t o a m easure of pol i t i cal pol ari sati on.  The gr eater
t he di f f erence betw een the t wo  p a r t i es in t erms  o f  the choi ce of infl ati on t he
greater i s the degree of pol i t i cal pol ari sati on.  I n t urn,  greater pol i t i cal
pol ari sati on i nfers height ened econom i c fl uct uat i ons as can be seen fr om
equat i ons (11) and (12).  The gr eater are b and c t he l arger is the eff ect of
electi ons  on  out put   f or  a gi ven  l evel  of  electi on  r esult   uncert aint y.
Equat i ons ( 11)  and ( 12)  also r eveal  t hat   t he mo r e unexpect ed t he electi on
r esult   t he l arger  t he pot enti al  econom i c f l uct uat i ons.   The  l ow er  t he probabi l i t y
of part y L bei ng el ected the l arger is out put  grow t h under part y L and t he
sm all er t he recession under part y R.  The hi gher t he probabi l i t y of part y L
electi on success the l ess is any part y L grow t h or the greater any part y R
r ecession.   For   a gi ven degree of  pol i t i cal  pol ari sati on,   a surpri se electi on r esult24
causes a l arger  busi ness cycle wh i l e a mo r e cert ain  r esult   gi ves  r i se t o  a sm all er
busi ness cycle.  Wa g e - bargai ners wh e n   f aced wi t h  a probabi l i sti c electi on  r esult
are usi ng opi ni on pol l s as a gui de t o t he electi on r esult   j ust   as punt ers use t he
past  form o f  horses in pl acing t hei r  bet s. In eff ect,  the m ore uncert ain t he
electi on result  the m ore w age-bargai ners are edging t hei r  bet s and t he greater
t he  pot enti al  f or  a di screpancy bet w een t he  expected and  actual   i nfl ati on  r ates.
  Bot h  greater  pol i t i cal  pol ari sati on  and  electi on  r esult   uncert aint y  gi ve  r i se
t o greater  out put   f l uct uat i ons.   The  durati on of  t he post - electi on f l uct uat i ons i s
dependent  upon t he t i me  t hat  w age cont r acts have t o run w hen t he el ecti on
occurs. The mos t  str aight f orwa r d scenari o w oul d be w hen al l  w age cont r acts
are signed  simu l t aneously.   Gi ven  t he  assum pti ons  of  t he  m odel ,   wa g e   cont r acts
signed aft er the el ecti on do not  gi ve ri se to out put  fl uct uat i ons si nce vot ers
know  w ho i s in pow er and t hei r  di screti onary i nfl ati on choi ce. Ho we v e r ,  the
i nfl ati on rate is alw ays hi gher under a part y L governm ent  because thei r
di screti onary i nfl ati on choi ce r efl ects a str onger  i ncenti ve t o generate i nfl ati on
surpri ses and  t he  hi gher  r elati ve  we i ght   gi ven  t o  out put   as opposed  t o  i nfl ati on.
The r ati onal  part i san m odel  seem s m ost appropri ate for count r i es w it h a
t wo - part y  system  and  wi t h  f i xed  electi on  dat es.  I n  t he  UK  cont ext  t he  m odel   i s
undermi ned by t he fl exibi l i t y of the el ecti on dat e. Wa g e - bargai ners are not
f aced by a soli t ary source of uncert aint y.  Ra t her,  t hey are faced by both
electi on  r esult   uncert aint y  and  electi on  dat e uncert aint y.   The  i mp l i cati on  of  t hi s
addi t i onal   source of  uncert aint y i s addi t i onal   devi ati ons f r om  t r end.   Tes t i ng of
t he rati onal  part i san theory i n t hi s sett i ng i s m ade acutely di f f i cult .  M odel l i ng25
procedures w oul d have t o t ake int o account  t he uncert aint y of t he actual
electi on result  as w ell  as the uncert aint y over t he actual  electi on dat e.
Mo r eover,  the t i me  b e t w een electi ons can be short .  For  inst ance, in t he U K
t here we r e t wo   electi ons  i n  1974.
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Even i f  electi on dat es are fi xed,  m odel l i ng procedures have t o t ake int o
account   electi on  r esult   uncert aint y.   Thi s i s not   t he  case wi t h  t he  t ests em ployed
by A l esina and Roubi ni  (1992).  The i dea w as to see w hether an int ervent i on
t erm  can be added t hat  achieves stati sti cal signi f i cance. Ho we v e r ,  thei r  term
r equi r es a change in t he pol i t i cal persuasion of governm ent .  They m ake the
assum pti on t hat  wh e n  t he i ncum bent  has been  re-elected it  has t ended t o
coinci de w i t h el ecti ons t hat  have i nvol ved "vi r t ual l y no pol i t i cal uncert aint y"
( p. 669).   Thi s,  of  course,  w oul d  i n  t urn  i mp l y  vi r t ual l y  no  econom i c bl i p.
To show  very si mp l y t hat  the l i nk bet w een re-electi on and t he l ack of
electi on r esult   uncert aint y i s generall y unfounded,   we   devi sed an i ndex of  UK
electi on result  uncert aint y.  Thi s index w as for the t en electi ons fr om  O ct ober
1959 t o Ap r i l   1992.   Da t a wa s   t aken f r om  Ga l l up opi ni on pol l s concerni ng t he
expected w inners of the next  general electi on.  W e assum e that  the el ectorate
f ace a choice betw een voti ng Conservat i ve or vot i ng Labour.  The uncert aint y
i ndex i s the rati o of the average percentage of peopl e quest i oned i n t he four
quart ers up t o and i ncl udi ng t he el ecti on quart er w ho bel i eved the actual
electi on wi nners w oul d i ndeed wi n t o t hose w ho bel i eved t he electi on wi nners
w oul d actual l y l ose.
12 The l ow er the i ndex t he m ore uncert ain t he result .  The
r esult ant  i ndex  of  uncert aint y  i s show n  i n  t able 1.26
Tabl e 1:  Index  of  uncertai nt y
Oc t ober  8t h,   1959 1. 95 O ct ober  10t h,   1974 1. 48
Oc t ober  15t h,   1964 1. 85 M ay  3rd,   1979 1. 48
Ma r ch 31st ,   1966 1. 18 June  9t h,   1983 3. 89
June  18t h,   1970 1. 54 June  11t h,   1987 2. 28
Febr uary  28t h,   1974 1. 27 A pri l   9t h,   1992 1. 54
Of  these el ecti ons,  the 1966 el ecti on i s deem ed to have been t he m ost
uncert ain.   Thi s electi on  saw  Labour  r e-elected t aking  363  of  t he  651  seats.  Thi s
clearl y r efut es t he associati on bet w een r e-electi on and a l ack of  electi on r esult
uncert aint y.   The  electi ons  of  1983  and  1987  do  support   t he  assert i on  of  Al esina
and  Roubi ni ,   but   generall y  t here i s no  clear  associati on  bet w een r e-electi on  and
a l ack of  uncert aint y.
The r ati onal  part i san theory i s devoi d of a dynam i c and int eracti ve
r elati onshi p  bet w een t he  econom y  and  t he  pol i t y.   Popul ari t y  does  not   i nfl uence
pol i cy, but  r ather det ermi nes t he m agni t ude of econom i c fl uct uat i ons.
I ndi vi dual s are assum ed to vot e accordi ng t o pol i cy rather t han econom i c
perf orm ance as in st r ong part i san theory.  Ho we v e r ,  to use pol i cy as a voti ng
i ndi cator  r equi r es str ong  assum pti ons  about   t he  i nforma t i on  avail able t o  vot ers.
I n part i cular,  they m ust  com prehend the i deol ogi cal mo t i vat i ons of pol i t i cal
behavi our and t he i mp l i cati ons i n relati on t o pol i cy and econom i c outcom es.
Thi s i s despi t e t he  f l ui di t y  of  i deol ogy.27
4.   Ra t i onal   pol i t i cal  busi ness cycle
The r ati onal  pol i t i cal busi ness cycle m odel s assum e that  a governm ent ’ s
obj ecti ve funct i on can be defi ned i n t erms  o f  opport uni sm  or vot e-
ma x i mi sati on.  I n cont r ast t o t he pure pol i t i cal busi ness cycle m odel  of
No r dhaus t hese m odel s assum e t hat   i ndi vi dual s f orm  expectati ons accordi ng t o
t he  r ati onal   expectati ons  hypot hesi s.
The r ati onal  pol i t i cal busi ness cycle is m ost closel y associated w it h t he
wo r ks of Rogoff  and Si bert  (1988),  Rogoff  (1990) and Persson and Tabel l i ni
( 1990).  Ther e is, how ever,  a dif f erence in t he focus of t he Persson and
Tabel l i ni  vari ant i n t hat  i t  f ocuses on governm ent s dem onst r ati ng t hei r
com petence at  m anagi ng  t he  i nfl ati on-unem pl oym ent   r elati on.   The  ot her  vari ant
consi ders how  governm ent s wi sh t o appear  com petent  i n r elati on t o m anagi ng
t he  publ i c f i nances.
Al t hough w e w i l l  be pri ma r i l y concerned w i t h t he i nst r um ent  cycle
vari ant,  a bri ef sketch of t he Persson-Tabel l i ni  f r am ew ork i s useful .  The
com m on elem ent is that  the obj ecti ve funct i on of vot ers can be defi ned over
com petence. The mor e com petent the governm ent  the l ow er the i nfl ati on cost
of an increase in out put .  Ef f ecti vel y,  a m ore com petent governm ent  faces a
f l att er  Phi l l i ps curve.   I n a K eynesi an m odel   and assum ing t hat   quant i t i es r eact
mo r e qui ckly  t han  pri ces,  t he  governm ent   i s m odel l ed as havi ng  an i ncenti ve  at
electi ons  t o  pursue pol i ces aime d   at  aff ecti ng  out put ,   possibl y  by  i ni t i ati ng  new
governm ent  fi nanced cont r acts. The aim i s to appear mo r e com petent.  Thi s28
i ncenti ve ari ses since post - electi on t he governm ent  can part ake in i nfl ati on
f i nanci ng  of  t hese  expendi t ures so t hat   t he  f ul l   cost  i n  t erms   of  i nfl ati on  i s onl y
r evealed aft er indi vi dual s have cast  thei r  vot e. Compe t ent governm ent s m ay
i r oni call y have m ore of an incenti ve t o dem onst r ate thei r  com petence simp l y
because t hey are able t o do so.  Thi s i s because i t   i s assum ed t hat   governm ent s
do pl ace som e we i ght   on social  we l f are and acutely i ncom pet ent  governm ent s
w oul d not  engage i n expansi onary pol i cies since the fut ure infl ati on cost s
w oul d  be  t oo  great.
I n concent r ati ng on t he i nst r um ent - based version of r ati onal  pol i t i cal
busi ness cycle theory w e fol l ow  Rogoff  ( 1990).  The key concept  i n t he
approach is that  of adm ini str ati ve com petence. Thi s is defi ned as t he revenue
needed to del i ver a given l evel of governm ent  goods and servi ces. The mor e
com petent  i s governm ent   t he l ess r evenue i t   r equi r es t o provi de t he gi ven l evel
of  goods  and  servi ces.
An  i ndi vi dual ' s uti l i t y funct i on i s defi ned over thei r  consum pt i on of the
pri vat e good,  c, t he publ i c consum pt i on good per capit a, g,  t he publ i c
i nvest me n t  good per capit a, k, and a "l ooks" shock,  η.  The l ooks shock i s
i nt ended t o capture those factors related to t he abi l i t y of the governm ent  and
Pr i me  Mi ni ster t o l ead or govern,  but  wh i ch are not  corr elated w it h t hei r
com petence in adm i ni steri ng t he product i on of publ i c goods.  An  i ndi vi dual ’ s
consum pt i on of the pri vat e good i s dir ectl y related to t he cost  of the publ i c
goods,τ.   Tax  i s i n t he f orm  of  l um p-sum s.  I t   i s assum ed t hat   t he t ot al  cost  of
publ i c goods  i n  t he  curr ent  peri od  r efers t o  t hose  consum pt i on  goods  wh i ch can29
be  consum ed  i n  t hi s peri od  but   t o  t hose  i nvest me n t   goods  t hat   are consum ed  i n
t he  f ol l ow i ng  peri od,   t +1.
Each part y' s com petence shock is seri all y corr elated w hich provi des
i ndi vi dual s w it h t he i ncenti ve t o vot e for a part y t hat  curr entl y appears m ore
com petent.  The com petence shocks for the t wo  p a r t i es are independent  and
com petence is deem ed to vary across ti m e and across pol i t i cal l eaders.
Compe t ence i s an i nherent  characteri sti c of  t he  pol i t i cal  part y  and  i t s l eader.
I n any peri od vot ers are able t o j oi nt l y observe t axes,  τ, and governm ent
consum pt i on spendi ng,   g.  Ho we v e r ,  they have t o use t hi s informa t i on t o form
expectati ons about  invest me n t  spendi ng w hi ch is ‘consum ed’ in t he fol l ow i ng
peri od and,   consequent l y,   about   t he i ncum bent ' s l atest  com petency shock.   The
governm ent   t hus  hol ds  an i nforma t i onal   advant age.
The  i ncum bent   has  t o  set  t he  l evel  of  consum pt i on  spendi ng  and  l um p  sum
t axes before it  observes i t s "looks" shock al t hough t he vot er can observe t hi s
pri or  t o vot i ng.   The  assum pti on i s based on t he f act  t hat   i t   t akes t i me   t o coll ect
t axes and deli ver servi ces w hil e the "l ooks" shock i s int ended t o capture
i nforma t i on ri ght  up t o el ecti on day.  The i ndi vi dual  vot er wi l l  com pare thei r
expected ut i l i t y  under  t he  t wo   pol i t i cal  part i es.
The i ncum bent  leader wi l l  ma x i mi se a discount ed funct i on defi ned over
t he probabi l i t y,   π,   of    bei ng i n off i ce aft er  t he electi on and over  social  we l f are
wh i ch r elates bot h t o t he mi x of  publ i c consum pt i on and i nvest me n t   goods and
t o t he consum pt i on of the pri vat e good.  The i nforma t i on advant age that  the30
governm ent   hol ds all ow s i t   signal   t o vot ers i t s unobserved com petency.  I t   can
do t hi s through m ani pul ati ons of g and τ. Si gnal l i ng ari ses because there is a
l i mi t  to t he am ount  that  the i ncum bent  w oul d be prepared to m ani pul ate the
publ i c f i nances.   As   wi t h t he Per sson and Tabel l i ni   m odel   t he i ncum bent   pl aces
som e w eight  on soci al we l f are. Ther efore, the i ncum bent  is concerned about
t he m i x of publ i c consum pt i on and i nvest me n t  and t he need t o resort  t o
i nfl ati on  f i nanci ng  of  publ i c expendi t ures
Vo t ers can be  ma n i pul ated by  t he  l evel  of  t he  l um p-sum  t ax r elati ve  t o  t he
l evel  of  publ i c consum pt i on goods because of  t he i nforma t i on a s y mme t r y.   The
t em ptati on t o si gnal  aff ects social we l f are and thus Rogoff  and Sibert  (1988)
l i ken i t   t o cheati ng.   I f   t he sum  of  t he i ndi ces of  com petence and non-econom i c
popul ari t y are low  a ri se in non-econom i c popul ari t y i s li kel y t o i ncrease the
i ncenti ve t o cheat  mo r e t han i f   t he sam e sum  i s greater  t han t he expected l evel
of com petence. Ther efore, t he relati onshi p bet w een popul ari t y and
ma n i pul ati ons of governm ent  i nst r um ent s is dependent  upon perceived
com petence.  Ther e i s no  cheati ng  i n  non-electi on  years since t he  publ i c are able
t o  observe  t he  l evel  of    publ i c i nvest me n t   and  t he  com petence shock  r elati ng  t o
t he  peri od  t +1  i n  t he  peri od  t +2.
The pr e-electi on t endency for governm ent  t o favour consum pt i on
spendi ng over i nvest me n t  spendi ng can be referr ed to as t he vi sibi l i t y
hypot hesi s. The concept of vi sibi l i t y refers bot h t o t he i mme d i acy of pol i cy
i mp l i cati ons  and  t o  t he  mo r e concentr ated eff ect  on  i ndi vi dual s.  The  benefi t s of
capit al  expendi t ures ma y   t ake l onger  t o  appear  and  be  l ess t angi bl e.  Tes t s of  t he31
vi sibi l i t y hypot hesi s coul d be f ocused upon pre-electi on expansi ons of  curr ent
expendi t ures. A n adequate test w oul d presum ably requi r e the i dent i f i cati on of
narr ow l y defi ned expendi t ures.  I t   w oul d also have t o be borne i n mi nd t hat   t he
i ncenti ve t o si gnal  com petence is not  const ant and cruci all y dependent  upon
perceived  com petence.
Ha r r i ngt on (1993) not ed that  i f  i nforme d  i ndi vi dual s coul d observe
pol i cies t hen vot i ng w oul d depend on pol i cies and not   econom i c perf orm ance.
The assum pti on t hat  vot i ng depends on pol i cy is m ade in t he case of rati onal
pol i t i cal  busi ness cycle m odel s and i n t he str ong and r ati onal   part i san t heori es.
The abil i t y t o bot h observe and com prehend past  pol i cies is a str ong
assum pti on.  For  inst ance, an indi vi dual ' s tax bil l  com pri ses a m ix of a local
propert y t ax
13  and i ndi r ect  and di r ect  t axes.  I n r eturn t hey r eceive a bundl e of
publ i c goods and servi ces provi ded centr all y and l ocall y.   The  l i nk bet w een t he
"tax pri ce" of publ i c goods and t hei r  consum pt i on i s dif f i cult  to evaluat e. If
pol i cy is dif f i cult  to evaluat e, let alone di f f i cult  to observe,  indi vi dual s are
l i kel y  t o  use  ot her  i ndi cators i n  decidi ng  upon  t hei r   vot i ng  i nt enti ons.
The r elati onshi p bet w een the econom y and t he pol i t y coul d be bet t er
devel oped.   I n part i cular,   i t   i s uncl ear  how  com petence ori gi nat es.  The  i ssue of
com petence is clearl y a fr ui t f ul  one for researchers. The t erm c o mp e t ence is
oft en m isused and t here is a need for a bett er understandi ng of wh a t  i t
encapsulates.  T his is cert ainl y t r ue i n t h e  UK wh e r e the perceived abi l i t y t o
govern  has  been an i m port ant  det ermi nant   of  r ecent  electi on  r esult s.32
5.   Re f l ecti ons  on  pol i t i cal  busi ness cycle mo d e l s
The pol i t i cal busi ness cycle li t erature can be sum m ari sed accordi ng t o four
m odel   t ypes:   ( 1)  Pur e pol i t i cal  busi ness cycles;  ( 2)  St r ong part i san t heory;   ( 3)
W eak part i san t heory  and  ( 4)  Ra t i onal   pol i t i cal  busi ness cycles.
U nderl yi ng t he N ordhaus (pure) pol i t i cal busi ness m odel  and t he Frey
and Schnei der vari ant of w eak part i san theory i s the score hypot hesi s. Thi s
vi ew s vot ers as naive such t hat  t hey aw ard i mp r ovem ent s in econom i c
condi t i ons w i t h i ncreases in governm ent  popul ari t y.  The s cor e hypot hesi s is
i deol ogi call y-f r ee alt hough i deol ogy shoul d not   be di scount ed i n an analysi s of
governm ent  popul ari t y.  The m echanism  by w hi ch ideol ogy aff ects popul ari t y
i ndi ces needs to be pursued furt her.  It  is perhaps appropri ate to consi der how
vot ers int erpret the com petence of pol i t i cal part i es in deal i ng w i t h t he m ost
urgent  probl em , eit her econom i c or non-econom i c. In t hi s respect popul ari t y
becom es a funct i on of i deol ogy and perceived com pet ence. Fur t her,  vot er
expectati ons are an im port ant m echanism  in det ermi ni ng popul ari t y.  I f
unem pl oym ent   i s expected t o wo r sen t hen vot i ng i nt enti ons ma y   r efl ect  vi ew s
concerni ng  t he  r elati ve  abil i t i es of  t he  part i es t o  t ackle t hi s probl em .
R esearch i nt o m odel l i ng t he popul ari t y of  pol i t i cal  part i es shoul d perhaps
bet t er appreciate the i nt er- r elati onshi ps bet w een ideol ogy,  com petence and
expectati ons.  Thi s is perhaps best  hi ghl i ght ed by t he Conservat i ve Part y’s
abil i t y t o w i n t he 1992 U K  general electi on despi t e high unem pl oym ent ,33
expectati ons of even higher unem pl oym ent  and t he Conservat i ves associati on
wi t h  pri ori t i sing  i nfl ati on  over  unem pl oym ent .
De s p i t e fl exibl e electi on dat es in m any count r i es, incl udi ng t he U K ,  the
pol i t i cal busi ness cycle theory t ypi call y w orks under the assum pti on of fi xed
peri odi cal electi ons.  Imp l i cati ons for all  m odel s vari ants fol l ow  fr om  fl exibl e
electi on  dat es.  No t   l east,   f l exibl e electi on  dat es gi ve  governm ent s an addi t i onal
pol i cy inst r um ent .  On e  wo u l d expect  t hi s to dam pen t he m agni t ude of
opport uni sti c m anipul ati ons of pol i cy inst r um ent s. I n t he N ordhaus m odel
governm ent  can w ait  f or econom i c imp r ovem ent  r ather t han create a pre-
electi on boom .  Fur t her,  the act of signal l i ng i n t he rati onal  pol i t i cal busi ness
cycle m odel   coul d  be  r eplaced by  t he  act  of  call i ng  an electi on.
The  f l exibi l i t y  of  t he  electi on  dat e has  not   seem ingl y  been a ma j or  i ssue i n
w eak part i san theory.  Ho we v e r ,  di scussion i s equal l y relevant here. Fl exibl e
electi on  dat es i nt erf ere wi t h  t he  concept  of  a cri t i cal  popul ari t y  l ead wh i ch i s at
t he heart  of t he Frey and Schnei der m odel .  It  i s the key t o t he sw i t ching
m echanism  w hich causes poli cy behavi our t o sw i t ch betw een being ei t her
i deol ogi cal or opport uni sti c. R esearch could perhaps consi der wh e t her t he
addi t i onal  pol i cy inst r um ent  of choosi ng t he el ecti on dat e imp l i es any greater
scope  f or  part i san pol i cies.
The second w eak part i san m odel  is that  of rati onal  part i san theory.  The
m odel  cruci all y depends on t he assum pti on of part i san part i es, r ati onal
expectati ons and perf ect  ma r ket s.  I ndi vi dual s are assum ed t o be f ul l y i nforme d34
alt hough an i nforma t i on gap ari ses i n t he electi on peri od concerni ng t he r esult
of  t he  electi on  and  t hus  t he  f ut ure pol i cy-ma k e r   ‘ t ype’.   A  f l exibl e electi on  dat e
ceases to render electi on result  uncert aint y t he sol e source of econom i c
devi ati ons.   The  second  source i s electi on  dat e uncert aint y.   Wa g e - bargai ners are
not   onl y f aced wi t h a probabi l i sti c electi on but   wi t h t he addi t i onal   probl em  of
wh e n  t he el ecti on i t self  wi l l  be.  The i mp l i cati on i s of addi t i onal  econom i c
f l uct uat i ons.
I t   ma y   we l l   be  t hat   t he  assum ed behavi oural  t ypes  of  t he  pol i t i cal  busi ness
cycle m odel s are typi call y t oo si mp l i sti c. Per haps opport uni sti c behavi our
shoul d i ncl ude behavi our wh e r eby pol i t i cal part i es act i n a w ay so as t o
dem onst r ate t hei r   abil i t y  t o  m ange  bot h  sides  of  t he  Phi l l i ps  r elati on  and  t o  deal
wi t h t hose i ssues typi call y i dent i f i ed w it h al t ernat i ve pol i t i cal part i es. Thi s
behavi our is not  consi dered in any of the four m odel  types.  Even i n t he Frey
and Schnei der  vari ant,   wh i ch r ecogni ses t he need f or  pol i t i cal  part i es t o appeal
t o bot h t hei r   core vot ers and f l oat i ng vot ers,  opport uni sti c behavi our  i s simp l y
m odel l ed as t hat   of  t he  pre-electi on  phase  of  t he  pure pol i t i cal  busi ness cycle.
Mo r e research is needed to analyse t he i nst r um ent s of pol i t i cal
expedi ency. The r ati onal  pol i t i cal busi ness cycle off ers the possi bi l i t y t hat
governm ent  expendi t ure pol i cy w il l  be bi ased tow ards consum pt i on and aw ay
f r om  i nvest me n t  expendi t ures. Consum pt i on expendi t ures are m ore imme d i ate
and mo r e vi sibl e expendi t ures.  The  ma n i pul ati on of  expendi t ure i n accordance
wi t h t he vi sibi l i t y hypot hesi s requi r es research based on narr ow l y defi ned
com ponent s of  expendi t ures.35
6.   Br i dgi ng  t he  gap  wi t h  t he  new  pol i t i cal  m acroeconom ics
W e have seen how  t he pol i t i cal busi ness cycle li t erature can be categori sed
accordi ng t o t he obj ecti ve funct i on of the pol i cy-ma k e r  and t he nat ure of the
expectati ons process.  I n t he l ast  part   of  t hi s paper  we   bri efl y consi der  how  t he
pol i t i cal busi ness cycle li t erature and the new  pol i t i cal m acroeconom i cs
com plem ent one anot her.  In part i cular,  w e consi der how  t he t wo  s t r ands of
l i t erature have been brought  toget her by t he w ork of Al esina i n relati on t o
excessive i nfl ati on and how  w e coul d draw  on ot her str ands of pol i t i cal
busi ness cycle t heory  t o  str engt hen  t hi s t i e.
Wi t h t he grow i ng ascendancy of new  cl assical m acroeconom i cs in t he
1970s t he m odel s of No r dhaus,  Hi bbs and Frey and Schnei der we r e open t o
cri t i cism . Thi s centr ed on t he abi l i t y of governm ent s to actual l y m ani pul ate
out put  and unem pl oym ent  in t he w ay t hese m odel s descri bed.  At  the heart  of
new  classical  m acroeconom i cs i s t he pol i cy neut r ali t y r esult .   Thi s i nsi sted t hat
under cert ain condi t i ons ant i cipat ed m onet ary or fi scal pol i cy w oul d have no
aff ect  on t he econom y’s out put   or  unem pl oym ent   l evels.  Thi s r equi r ed r ati onal
expectati ons,  ma r ket  cleari ng and an aggregate suppl y funct i on such t hat  onl y
err ors r elati ng t o pri ces w oul d r esult   i n out put   or  unem pl oym ent   m ovi ng aw ay
f r om   a nat ural  l evel.
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The m odel s of No r dhaus,  Hi bbs and Frey and Schnei der sat
uncom fort ably  wi t h  t he  new   classical  pol i cy neut r ali t y  proposi t i on.   Al esina  has36
done m ore than m ost  to show  t hat  it  is possibl e to t ake the i deas of pol i t i cal
busi ness cycle t heori sts,  em bed t hem  wi t hi n new  classical  t r adit i on and sti l l   be
able to descri be a pol i t i cal busi ness cycle. Wh a t  causes cycles in out put  and
unem pl oym ent  is the i nforma t i onal  gap caused by el ecti on result  uncert aint y.
Si mi l arl y,  the rati onal  pol i t i cal busi ness cycle school  has show n t hat  in t he
presence of  r ati onal   expectati ons an i nforma t i onal   gap concerni ng governm ent
com petence can r esult   i n cycles i n eit her  i nst r um ent s or  econom i c out com es or
i ndeed bot h.  Ho we v e r ,  thi s school  is rather mo r e diverse and not  all  m odel s
i ncorporate all  three of the new  cl assical m acroeconom i c ingredients. It  is the
Al esina m odel  t hat  has bui l t  a bri dge bet w een tr adit i onal  pol i t i cal busi ness
cycle t heori sts and  new   classical  m acroeconom i cs.
Wh i l e Al esina’s m odel   i s oft en used  t o  f ocus  on  how   a pol i t i cal- econom i c
cycle can r esult   f r om   a new   classical  m acroeconom i c m odel ,   i t   also show s  how
pol i t i cs can subt l y  aff ect  t he  m agni t ude  of  i nfl ati on  bi as or  t he  degree of  excess
i nfl ati on.  The concept of infl ati on bi as arose fr om  t he w ork of K ydl and and
Pr escott  ( 1977).  Wi t hi n a new  cl assical m acroeconom i c m odel  t he
governm ent ’ s obj ecti ve funct i on i s m odel l ed over t he cost s and benefi t s of
i nfl ati on.  Mo r eover,  t he governm ent  i nheri t s the obj ecti ve funct i on of t he
me d i an vot er.  Wh i l e governm ent  w oul d prefer low  l evels of infl ati on per se,
t hey deri ve w el f are fr om  out put  gai ns t hat  leads to t he l evel of out put  ri sing
above and unem pl oym ent   f all i ng bel ow  t hei r   nat ural  l evels.  Ho we v e r ,   t hi s can
onl y be achi eved by surpri se infl ati on and so governm ent  i s m odel l ed as
pl acing a part i cular we i ght  on out put  relati ve t o i nfl ati on.  The gr eater t hi s37
we i ght  the m ore prepared they are to use surpri se infl ati on and t hus hi gher
i nfl ati on  t o  boost   out put   and  r educe unem pl oym ent .
I n t he K ydl and and Prescott  m odel ,  t he publ i c are aw are of a
governm ent ’ s incenti ve.  Infl ati onary expect ati ons are biased upw ards w hi ch
causes governm ent  to del i ver hi gher infl ati on.  If  they di d not  then t he result
w oul d be l ow er out put  and hi gher unem pl oym ent .  The i ncenti ve t o generate
surpri se infl ati on si mp l y l eads to excessive i nfl ati on.  The degree of t hi s
excessive i nfl ati on depends on t he r elati ve we i ght   gi ven t o out put   and surpri se
i nfl ati on.  Thi s w eight  wa s  r eferr ed to by Barr o and G ordon as t he benefi t
param eter.   The  greater  t he  benefi t   param eter,   t he  greater  i nfl ati on  bi as.  I nfl ati on
bi as is m easured fr om  t he governm ent ’ s bli ss point  infl ati on rate. The bl i ss
poi nt   i s t he  com binat i on  of  i nfl ati on  and  unem pl oym ent / out put   t hat   del i vers t he
governm ent   t he  hi ghest   possibl e l evel  of  sati sfacti on.
The Al esina m odel  t akes the t w o pol i t i cal part i es as placing di f f erent
r elati ve we i ght s on out put   t o i nfl ati on.   Ther efore,  t he benefi t   param eters of  t he
t w o pot enti al governm ent s are dif f erent.  A l eft - of- centr e governm ent  w oul d
pl ace m ore w eight  on out put  and t hus surpri se infl ati on t han a ri ght - of- centr e
governm ent .   Consequent l y,   t he i nfl ati on bi as of  t he f orme r   i s greater  t han t hat
of the l att er.  Al t hough Barr o and G ordon (1983) argue t hat  there m ight  be
dow nw ard pressure on i nfl ati on bi as because governm ent s value t he fut ure
credibi l i t y  of  t hei r   econom i c pol i cy,  t here w oul d  seem  no  r eason t o  bel i eve t hat
one part y w oul d be mo r e concerned about   t hi s f ut ure cost  ari sing f r om  t oday’s38
surpri se infl ati on.  The r esult  is that  infl ati on i s higher under a left - wi ng as
opposed  t o  a r i ght - wi ng  governm ent .
Al esina’s m odel  borr ow s t he concept  of i deol ogy fr om  t he t r adit i onal
pol i t i cal busi ness cycle school  t o draw  inferences w it hi n a new  cl assical
f r am ew ork.  In part i cular,  Al esina’s m odel  is an extension of the Barr o and
Go r don f r am ew ork.   Ho we v e r ,   i t   i s also possibl e t o consi der  how  opport uni sm
coul d aff ect  i nfl ati on bi as.  Per haps,   t he best   wa y   t o t hi nk of  opport uni sm  i s i n
t he m anner of Fr ey and Schnei der.  They essenti all y saw  opport uni sm  as
r efl ecti ng t he t i me   elapsed i n an electi on peri od and t he governm ent ’ s l evel  of
popul ari t y  r elati ve  t o  t hat   of  t he  opposi t i on.
O nce coul d  i ma g i ne  defi ni ng  a di scount ed popul ari t y  i ndex  t o  m easure t he
i ncenti ve for opport uni sm . Popul ari t y coul d be di scount ed or we i ght ed by t he
t i me   t o t he next   electi on.   As   Fr ey and Schnei der  t hem sel ves not e,  unpopul ari t y
can be  t ol erated by  a governm ent   i n  t he  earl y  part   of  an electi on  peri od  but   l ess
and  l ess so as t he  next   electi on  approaches.  O pport uni sm  w oul d  t hen  aff ect  t he
r elati ve i m port ance of out put  t o i nfl ati on.  The gr eater t he i ncenti ve for
opport uni sm  the m ore w eight  governm ent  pl aces on output  and t hus surpri se
i nfl ati on.  The i ncenti ve w oul d be t o court  popul ari t y si nce the governm ent ’ s
we l f are f unct i on  i s i nheri t ed f r om   t he  me d i an vot er.
The i mp l i cati on of our we i ght ed popul ari t y i ndex i s that  unpopul ari t y
i ncreases t he  val ue  of  t he  governm ent ’ s benefi t   param eter.   The  cost  of  i nfl ati on
ma t t ers r elati vel y l ess.  The  eff ect  i s t o i ncrease i nfl ati on bi as.  The  governm ent39
i s wi l l i ng t o accept  mo r e i nfl ati on f or  som e am ount   of  extr a out put .   Si nce t he
ma r gi nal  r ate of subst i t ut i on bet w een infl ati on and out put  i s aff ected,
i ndi vi dual s’ expectati ons of infl ati on are aff ected result i ng i n hi gher infl ati on.
I f   t he  bl i ss l evel  of  i nfl ati on  i s unaff ected,  t he  r esult   i s greater  i nfl ati on  bi as.
We   can use  t he  sam e not ati on  as t hat   used  f or  t he  earl i er  deri vat i on  of  t he
Al esina m odel   i n order  t o show  t he possibl e eff ect  of  opport uni sm  on i nfl ati on
and i nfl ati on bi as. A ssum e that  pol i cy-ma k e r  i  has t he fol l ow i ng obj ecti ve
f unct i on:
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Ther efore,  i nfl ati on  i s hi gher  wh e n   t he  popul ari t y  of  t he  pol i cy-ma k e r   i s l ow er.
Fur t hermo r e, it  fol l ow s t hat  the i nfl ati on bi as, wh i ch is m easured fr om  t he40
opt i ma l  i nfl ati on rate, i s greater w hen governm ent  or pol i cy-ma k e r  i  i s
unpopul ar.
Ther e ma y   be  f urt her  pressure f r om   opport uni sm  t o  i ncrease i nfl ati on  bi as
since, in addi t i on t o out put  havi ng greater relati ve i m port ance, the degree to
wh i ch t he  l oss of  f ut ure credibi l i t y  ma t t ers decreases.  Ther efore,  t he  dow nw ard
pressure f r om   t he  credibi l i t y  cost  i dent i f i ed by  Ba r r o  and  Go r don  i s l i kel y  t o  be
l ess.  Coupl ed wi t h t he hi gher  benefi t   param eter,   t he greater  di scount i ng of  any
credibi l i t y l oss w orks t o i ncrease infl ati on bi as duri ng peri ods of governm ent
unpopul ari t y.
I n  concl usi on,   by  draw ing  on  t he  pol i t i cal  busi ness cycle l i t erature and,   i n
part i cular,  t he w ay i n w hi ch the obj ecti ve funct i ons of pol i cy-ma k e r s are
m odel l ed, one can m ake furt her observat i ons as t o t he m agni t ude of infl ati on
bi as. In t hi s w ay the pol i t i cal busi ness cycle li t erature can com plem ent the
f ocus  on  i nfl ati on  of  t he  new   pol i t i cal  m acroeconom i cs.
7.   Fi nal   Co mme n t s
I n t hi s paper w e have review ed th e  mu c h  ma l i gned pol i t i cal busi ness cycle
l i t erature. W e have exam i ned t he i m port ance of t he expect ati ons forma t i on
process and t he characteri sati on of t he governm ent ’ s obj ecti ve funct i on.  It
w oul d appear t oo si mp l i sti c to suggest  t hat  governm ent s are solely
opport uni sti c or i deol ogi cal.  I ncorporati ng bot h behavi oural t ypes i nt o any
pol i t i cal  m acroeconom i c m odel   seem s t he  com m on  sense approach.41
A  centr al  t hem e of  t he new  pol i t i cal  m acroeconom i cs has been t he eff ect
of  pol i t i cs on i nfl ati on.   The  concept  of  i nfl ati on bi as ari ses f r om  t he port r ayal
of  a governm ent   i ncl i ned t o generate surpri se i nfl ati on.   Si nce t he governm ent ’ s
we l f are funct i on i s not hi ng m ore than t hat  of t he m edi an vot er t hi s is an
opport uni sti c m odel  in t he N ordhaus sense,  but  wi t hout  the repeated busi ness
cycle.  N onet hel ess,  i nfl ati on bi as i s t he r esult   of  opport uni sm  and t he desi r e t o
aff ect  t he  popul ari t y  of  t he  me d i an vot er.
Al esina show s how  a pol i t i cal busi ness cycle is possibl e w it hi n a new
classical fr am ew ork.  The i m port ance of thi s m odel  is that  it  uses behavi oural
characteri sti cs f r om   pol i t i cal  busi ness cycle t heory.   I nfl ati on  bi as i s det ermi ned
by  i deol ogy w hi ch aff ects the w ei ght  a pol i t i cal part y pl aces on surpri se
i nfl ati on relati ve t o t he cost  of infl ati on i t self .  He r e each part y i nheri t s the
we l f are f unct i on  of  i t s r epresentati ve  core const i t uent .   Thi s i s oft en f orgot t en i n
understandi ng G ordon Brow n’s decision t o grant t he Bank of Engl and
operati onal   i ndependence i n Ma y   1997.   Labour  ma y   have expected t here t o be
a greater  degree of  excessive i nfl ati on because of  t he publ i cs’  percepti on t hat ,
r elati ve  t o  t he  Conservat i ves,   i t   w oul d  pl ace l ess we i ght   on  t he  cost  of  i nfl ati on.
By s hi f t i ng responsi bi l i t y for m onet ary pol i cy to t he Bank i t  coul d hope t o
r em ove  t he  eff ect  of  i t s ow n  i deol ogy  on  i nfl ati on  bi as.
  Us i ng behavi oural characteri sti cs refl ecti ng bot h t he i m port ance of the
t i me  e l apsed in an electi on peri od and t he governm ent ’ s popul ari t y one can
f urt her  exam ine  pressures aff ecti ng  i nfl ati on  bi as.  Af t er  all ow i ng  f or  t he  t i me   t o42
an electi on,   unpopul ar  governm ent s ma y   f eel  mo r e i ncl i ned  t o  generate surpri se
i nfl ati on  wh i ch can l ead t o  greater  i nfl ati on  bi as.
The  f i nal   m essage of  t hi s paper  i s t hat   pol i t i cal  busi ness cycle t heory and
t he new  pol i t i cal m acroeconom i cs com plem ent one anot her.  Ther e is a clear
overl ap since bot h recogni se that  to t r ul y understand governm ent  econom i c
pol i cy one  mu s t   acknow l edge  i m port ant  pol i t i cal  di me n s i ons.43
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No t es
1  See also M acR ae ( 1977).
2  M acR ae ( 1977)  descri bes  t hi s as an i nvest me n t   f or  electi on  day  success.
3  The  UK  f i gures are f r om  Econom i c Tr ends ( vari ous edit i ons)  and t he OECD  f i gures
f r om   Econom i c Ou t l ook  ( vari ous  edit i ons).
4 For  inst ance, see M cC all um  (1978) for a refut ati on of the pure pol i t i cal busi ness
cycle in t he U S;  Ke i l  (1988) for support i ve evi dence i n t h e  UK f or out com e and
i nst r um ent  cycles; Al esina and Roubi ni  (1992) for a deni al of out com e cycles in an
i nt ernat i onal   cont ext  and Al esina,   Cohen and Roubi ni   ( 1992)  f or  som e w eak evidence
of  cycles i n  m onet ary  and  f i scal  vari ables i n  an i nt ernat i onal   cont ext
5  For   a count er  vi ew  see Per l ma n   ( 1958).
6  See i n  part i cular,   Hi bbs  ( 1977,   1982,   1986).
7  I nt eresti ngl y,   Hi bbs  ( 1992)  m oves  aw ay f r om   str ong  part i san t heory  by  r eferr i ng  t o  a
t r ade-off  bet w een opport uni sti c and ideol ogi cal consi derati ons.  Thi s is w eak part i san
t heory.
8  I n  part i cular,   see Fr ey ( 1978)  and  Fr ey and  Schnei der  ( 1978).
9  I n  1986(4)  33%   of  vot ers t hought   t he  Conservat i ves  w oul d  wi n  t he  next   electi on  and
44%  Labour.  Be t w een 1982(2) and 1989(4) t he average respecti ve fi gures w ere
57. 3%   and  22. 8% .
10  See Al esina  ( 1987),   Al esina  and  Sachs ( 1988)  and  Chappel l   and  K eech ( 1988).
11  The  t wo   electi ons  i n  1974  we r e on  Febr uary  28t h  and  Oc t ober  10t h.
12  The  average of  t he  f our  quart ers wa s   t aken i n  order  t o  r epresent  t he  t ypi cal  l engt h  of
t he  Br i t i sh wa g e   cont r act.49
13  I n  t he  UK  t he  l ocal  t ax i s t he  Counci l   Tax.   H ouses  are pl aced i nt o  one  of  eight   bands
accordi ng t o propert y val ue.  Ther e is a discount  of 25%  for those houses w i t h one
adul t   occupant   and  r ebates avail able f or  t hose  on  l ow   i ncom es.
14  For   a deri vat i on  of  a new   classical  aggregate suppl y  f unct i on  see Lucas ( 1973).